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1 Introduction
Malcolm Brynin, Ben Anderson and Yoel Raban
Who can doubt that new technologies, especially information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs), are now an integral part of a society profoundly
different from that which has gone before? Computers are a universal tool
in all leading economic nations and increasingly so in the poorer countries.
The Internet is a tool of daily life for hundreds of millions, while third-
generation mobile phones will soon be the norm. New, less hierarchical net-
works of communication are being developed and new goods and services are
proliferating. Services and information can be acquired virtually instantly.
For some time it has been asserted that we are, or soon will be, in a period of
revolutionary social and economic change as fundamental as the Industrial
Revolution (Drucker, 1969; Bell, 1973; Dutton et al., 1999; Castells, 2000).
Much analysis of the social importance of new technology examines the
effects of technological innovation in people’s everyday lives. Does the new
technology lead to a qualitative shift in the way we run our lives – making it
more efficient, more fulfilling, richer or, of course, possibly the reverse of all
of these? But the findings of some research hints at a more fundamental social
change, of the emergence of a new form of society where the new technologies
are held to variously erode, create, rework, but alternatively simply transform,
for good or ill (and sometimes simultaneously), the way people perform many
important aspects of their lives (Kraut et al., 1998, 2002; Franzen, 2000,
2003; Nie, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001; Gershuny, 2003). Each finding is
implicitly treated as the tip of a hidden iceberg. What is hidden is the future.
However, radical change is unlikely, and not only because of the deflation
of the dot-com bubble. The parallel with the Industrial Revolution (and
indeed the label ‘revolution’) is unconvincing on numerous counts – as,
indeed, we were forewarned (Trabner, 1986; Schnaars, 1989). In a particu-
larly well-argued critique, Christopher May (2001) suggests that there are
four linked tenets of the ‘revolution’:
• social revolution,
• transformation of economic relations,
• changes in political practices and the communities involved,
• terminal decline of the state and its authority.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
01 info692.ch01.pdf
Routledge Research
PR
OO
F O
NL
Y
May finds little evidence to support any of these general tenets. We need to
distinguish between form and substance. This argument resonates with Ger-
shuny’s assertion that, as technology changes, our lives carry on in familiar
ways; what changes is the means through which this happens (Gershuny,
1978, 1983).
In addition to conceptual or meta-analyses such as May’s, a growing body
of empirically based journal articles and books have sought to provide a
measured response to the rise of the new ICTs. These include Wellman and
Haythornthwaite’s collection (2002) and also that of Kraut et al. (forthcom-
ing). In the main, these collections have sounded a note of evidence-based
caution. As with May, they conclude from the data to hand that it is clear
enough that changes are happening, but it is not at all clear what the
threads of causality are and what their future significance might be.
So why do we care about change and effects?
There are perhaps three major reasons to be interested in the social side of
ICT-related change, which continues to engage the minds and resources of a
wide range of researchers. One, which is also the most direct, is the continu-
ing need to test the possibility that we are on the cusp of, or perhaps embed-
ded within, a major social and economic transition. We have cast doubt upon
this idea above, but the possibility is both fascinating and important, and
cannot be lightly dismissed. Even where fundamental change is unlikely, we
can help to map and test the significance of the myriad of small ICT-related
changes. Part of the rationale for this book is to help address this issue both
substantively, through a range of research results, and methodologically,
through the demonstration of the kinds of data and analysis required.
Academic work does not operate in a social vacuum. Many researchers act
as independent advisors to, and auditors of, policy-makers and NGOs. Some
of the chapters in this book are written by authors who have these twin aims
in mind. A second rationale for research in this area, and in particular for
this book, is therefore that policy-makers and non-governmental organisa-
tions throughout the world need to understand the sorts of changes that are
occurring in society, but which are not necessarily visible in or through offi-
cial statistics. Readers will be familiar with policy initiatives from Chile to
the USA or South Korea, or with the United Nations/International
Telecommunications Union sponsored World Summit on the Information
Society.1 Also at the supranational level the European Commission has initi-
ated the e-Europe and i2010 initiatives, which are explicitly about harness-
ing the potential of ICTs to help achieve policy objectives of social cohesion,
inclusion and economic growth (CEC, 2005). Clearly, in order to proceed in
an evidence-based manner, such policy initiatives need to be based on analy-
ses of what social benefits ensue for whom and from what kinds of ICTs.
Commercial actors also have a need to understand the same processes, for
instance to see how their markets and their supply chains are changing as
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ICTs become embedded, but more especially where their business is selling
ICT products and services. While academics do not often ally themselves to
such goals, it seems obvious to us that there are overlaps between them.
Even if social scientists are rarely privy to the vast amount of commercial
data that exist on the social demand for new technologies, services or brands,
and despite the gulf in analytical goals between academic and commercial
researchers, both are inevitably interested in the impact of social divisions on
ICT take-up and usage. The typology in the literature on diffusion between
innovators and laggards, for instance, directly reflects this joint interest.
Commercial interests wish to locate those who will both buy a new idea and
stick with it (and tell others about it), putting into their assessments of how
to find such people whatever information they might have on income, pref-
erences and prices. The social scientist has the same underlying interest, but
will use this or related information to say something about more social
processes. Thus, for instance, research on social exclusion from the benefits of
ICTs is simply the obverse of the commercial interest in social inclusion.
Malleable technologies
The introduction of any new good or service is often carried out with consid-
erable uncertainty over the target group and the match between its needs
and the affordances of the product. It is not surprising, therefore, that early
commercial and policy expectations are often misplaced (Anderson et al.,
2003). Unforeseen outcomes are a part of the process of technological
change. The increase in firepower in seventeenth-century armies led to
‘limited’ warfare where attempts were made to reduce casualties. Thus,
while new technology may drive much industrial change, it often does so in
unplanned and unpredictable ways (Form et al., 1988; McLoughlin and
Clark, 1994: 22–33; Kling, 1996). McLoughlin and Clark (1994) stress the
adaptive, and even accidental, side of technological development. No tech-
nologists, policy-makers or investors can wave a magic wand to make people
do things suddenly very differently. People have needs, constraints and pref-
erences that determine which innovations succeed or fail. Technology cannot
have effect unless there is social room for it to do so. People accept the tech-
nologies they want at the same time as they experiment with and adapt
them to their needs. The meaning of the technology itself may change
through use, whether at work (Robinson, 1993) or in the domestic setting –
creating what Bakardjieva calls ‘use genres’ (Bakardjieva, 2005). This also
makes prediction especially complex.
In the case of the new ICTs, the problem is even greater as many
new technologies are malleable and multi-functional. In contrast to older
technologies such as the television or the telephone, new ICTs are often
platforms for many different types of service. Thus the mobile phone was
a simple instrument built on the familiar functions of the fixed-line
telephone, but is now more complex. The home computer is a platform
Introduction 3
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providing quite disparate functions, which therefore attracts a range of often
distinct interests and could have a range of individual level social benefits
that cannot be meaningfully aggregated. The Internet is a delivery mechan-
ism for a complex bundling of services and functions. Thus, while it might
be possible to analyse and predict the demand for social benefits of specific
services, it is extremely hard to predict the take-up of new technologies of
the sort that form the subject of this book. There is simply unlikely ever to
be a single ‘killer technology’ at this level.
We can demonstrate this, if in rather simple form, through analysis of the
1998–2001 Home-OnLine dataset of British households (Anderson and Tracey,
2001). We do this by summarising the results of a large number of logistic
regressions where usage of a technology or service, or willingness to innovate,
is the dependent variable, and a range of variables such as age, family, educa-
tion, work, preferences (e.g. to the telephone – labelled ‘telephonic’ in the
table), division of household labour and time-use as measured by a time-use
diary) form the explanatory variables. The results indicate a general tendency
(which has, in turn, been assessed subjectively rather than through some
computational method). The end result is therefore similar to the kinds of
profiles and segmentation models generated by commercial or market
research using cluster analyses. However, what we present below are not pro-
files but bundles of profiles. The characteristics associated with usage of a
technology need not occur in one person, and are often extremely unlikely to,
whilst some characteristics are of households rather than of individuals.
Table 1.1a shows the results for three forms of ICT usage. The first, the
number of purchases made in a period of time over the Internet, shows
access to a fledgling technology. The second, the size of phone bills, demon-
strates consumption of a mature technology. Computer usage, in the middle
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Table 1.1a Factors predicting usage and uptake of goods and services
Internet purchases Computer usage Phone bills
Demographics Young male Young Young male
Education High/medium High High or low
Family Couples/kids Children Children
Chores No – Housework
Family beliefs – Illiberal Liberal
Shopping Equal/shared Equal/unshared Unequal
Telephonic – – High
Newspaper Quality Quality Quality
Leisure activity Indoor Cinema etc. Outdoor/social
Income Own pay Both Household
Work time – – –
Leisure time N/A – Cinema etc.
Social time N/A No No
ICT time N/A Little TV Telework
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column, is somewhere in between. These ‘profiles’ are in some respects quite
different. Although users or high users of all three are likely to be young and
male, and also in some sort of family relationship, education is not always a
consistent predictor. The distribution of household tasks varies across the
profiles, as do beliefs relating to the family and work (for instance, whether
women should work). Attitudes to phone usage are only notably high where
phone bills are high. Leisure activities vary considerably, and while income
is related to usage, in one case only own pay from work counts, in another
total household income, and in the third, both of them. Perhaps the most
powerful relationship is between phone usage and the use of a computer for
work at home (telework) – a clear case of a functional relationship.
Table 1.1b looks at a specific example of computer usage in the third
column – of games (measured through the diary). It can be seen that the
profile is quite different from that of general computer usage since it
describes young men with low incomes and few interests, still living with
their parents. When we move to questions which specifically ask about the
willingness to try new products (see also Diduca et al., this volume, Chapter
7) there is no real gender difference and education is not high, which makes
these people stand out: in particular, they are quite different from those who
are willing to try new technologies – who are young, male and have few
apparent other interests.
Do these differences represent different points on the diffusion curve or,
rather, a different bundle of preferences and constraints in each case? Both
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Table 1.1b Pactors predicting usage and update of goods and services (cont.)
Tries new technology Tries new products PC games
Demographics Young male Young Young male
Education High Medium Medium
Family Single – Children
Chores – Housework –
Family beliefs – – –
Shopping – Unequal Self
Telephonic – No –
Newspaper None Midbrow None
Leisure activity – Social –
Income – Own pay Negative
Work time Low High Low
Leisure time – No hobbies No hobbies
Social time No Yes No
ICT time PC PC Internet
Source: Home-OnLine Survey, UK Data Archive.
Note
For cells marked N/A, requiring time measures, analysis was not possible as a result of the
diary sample being significantly smaller than the full sample.
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might be a factor. That is, it is possible that when (or if) the Internet is as
widespread as the fixed-line telephone, then high usage on one will be
similar to high usage on another. However, this is unlikely to be the case.
The difference between high users of television and of the telephone already
indicates this. The choices people face, dictated by what the technologies
can do, are between complex clusters of preferences. This leads to very con-
siderable uncertainty on the part of consumers, investors and social scien-
tists; one of the most significant reasons for this is the increasing
malleability of the technologies in which we are interested. How can we
either predict the take-up of, say, a future generation of computers or under-
stand what social role they play, when different groups use these for differ-
ent purposes, and while these purposes simultaneously change? There is no
single process of change, but a stream of changes.
This has implications for both the way we conceptualise and analyse
change and the applicability of our results. It suggests that we cannot
simply analyse the demand for, or social benefits or disbenefits of, the Inter-
net or the mobile telephone. Rather, we need to ask questions about differ-
ent kinds of uses of different kinds of services. We should not expect to see
many ‘effects’ of Internet adoption because the uses to which the services
will be put may vary widely across a population and over time. Instead we
should focus at a lower level, on ICT-mediated activities such as online
shopping, interpersonal communication (via text, phone calls, voice mail,
email, instant messaging, chat, etc.), or job and health information foraging.
As editors we have encouraged some contributors to this book to pose their
questions and frame their analysis at this level.
How do we know what causes change?
With this as background, we must now consider the extent to which causal
explanations of the role of ICTs in social and economic change are possible.
After all, if policy-makers or commercial actors want to ground their
decisions not only on evidence but on some real sense of underlying social
processes, they need some explanatory model that can help them to take
decisions and reduce, or at least be forewarned about, otherwise unantici-
pated effects. In this instance a model based on association (e.g. ‘those with
Internet access have more social capital’) is not sufficient. We need to know
if using particular Internet-delivered services makes any real difference. Or
is it simply that those with greater social resources are more likely to adopt
the Internet simply because they are more wealthy and better educated?
However, causality is not something we can necessarily pick out concep-
tually, let along empirically. If we view technological change in terms of its
social construction rather than in terms of its social effects alone, then we
can especially see that the causal flow is often multi-pathed and even multi-
directional. Analytically, we have to say it is not clear how far down these
paths we should go. They make causal analysis very difficult. In actor
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network theory, for instance, technological outcomes are the result of a series
of ‘translations’ of technology design, implementation and use. Technology
is ‘performative’ rather than given (Latour, 1986, 2000). Even more radic-
ally, Grint and Woolgar argue that we can interpret all technology in social
terms (in much the same way, perhaps, that Marx viewed capital as the final
form of all the labour that goes into its construction). Even a bullet already
in its trajectory has a social rather than a technological meaning. We have to
go ever further back in the causal process to find not a cause, let alone an ori-
ginal cause, but yet more causality to unravel. Grint and Woolgar liken the
quest for ultimate causation to stripping away layer after layer of an onion,
only to find ‘there is nothing at the centre’ (1995: 164).
What then is the ‘stopping rule’? The relationships at the heart of the
discussion of the social significance of technological change are certainly
complex. But that does not mean that they should be viewed as endlessly
recursive or regressive, so we forever chase our own tails. This problem is
certainly acknowledged. Grint and Woolgar, for instance, argue that tech-
nical phenomena are ‘constituted (rather than . . . shaped, affected etc.) by
social processes’ (Grint and Woolgar, 1995: 51). Cause and effect here
become indistinguishable. Each apparent effect is a cause in some further
process. This is analytically neat but empirically insecure. The relationship
between the technological and the social becomes opaque, even somewhat
mysterious, almost personal to the analyst. It is no wonder that Grint and
Woolgar call their own method ‘hard work’ (1995: 114).
It also makes it very difficult to develop a general theory of social change
related to technology. This paradoxically returns us to the quest for effects.
At some point technologies or products and service come into the social
domain through the market or through policy/NGO interventions. Whilst
we always need to consider the social nature of their development and the
increasingly tight loop between use (consumption) and design, we need, at
specific points in time, to isolate how people are affected by technological
change, even if our view of the section of the causal chain we are analysing
would differ if we could examine a longer stretch. Ultimately, after all, the
chain is infinite. Probably none of the analysts discussed above, who have
helped to unravel the social meaning of technology, would object to the
simple idea, for instance, that technology is a mediator and sometimes
intensifier of existing social processes. This is a limited aim.
Even here we need to be precise about the level at which we expect
change to occur. In the introduction to the volume by Kraut et al. (forth-
coming), the analytical problem is viewed as one of being sure what level
you are dealing with. The most basic is where we analyse technology as a
tool and expect only limited behavioural changes, for instance through sub-
stituting one tool for another to achieve the same goal. However, new tech-
nologies might be associated with new goals, which form a broader level of
effects. If we can additionally observe changes in welfare outcomes, we again
move to a more extensive level. Finally, if the summation of these changes
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induces or interacts with some overall change in society, we are at the broad-
est of all levels.
The fundamental issue then becomes not, for instance, whether we can
genuinely infer from a small qualitative analysis that the Internet or any
other technology is making society closer, but whether the micro-level
effects we see aggregate into societal-level effects. As we have already sug-
gested, most analysts (including ourselves) like to think that what we find is
only the tip of the social iceberg. But in practice the relationship between
the micro and the macro, between the small and the large, is often indeter-
minate. At the very least, the whole is generally less than the sum of its
parts. But also, the sum might itself take a long time to work out. In the
relatively few years for which we generally have relevant data, the social phe-
nomena of interest are often difficult to observe effectively. In 2030 and
with the benefit of hindsight, we may be able to discern a cumulative,
aggregate change and thus be able to argue more cogently about revolution
or evolution, but in the here and now this is less certain. We need to think
very carefully about the methods we use to measure change and to ascribe
causality.
How is this to be done?
When we are looking for causal relationships, we can do this in the aggreg-
ate (e.g. national level) or through micro-level techniques. The former takes
averages and sees how these relate to each other. While comparing national
averages obscures the micro-level variation that occurs below that level,
research of this sort is at least avoiding possibly unwarranted inferences from
micro-level to macro-level change. The chapters in this book by Dutton,
Shepherd and di Genarro, by Rothgang and Schmidt, and by Dehio and
Graskamp, are examples of the aggregate approach. Most of the rest of the
analysis presented in the book is at the micro level, primarily of the indi-
vidual or household.
This might be qualitative or quantitative, and we have examples of each
here. Both have different things to offer, but both also have some overlap-
ping problems. These relate to the above discussion of whether or not we
really can separate out cause from effect. There has been a great deal of sta-
tistical effort designed to overcome these problems. We take as an example
the case of the computer wage premium that has developed within eco-
nomics, starting with Krueger (1993). What is the actual relationship
between the computer and the user? Does the premium derive from the
machine itself, from its software, from the skills it requires, or from the
processes for which it is typically used? DiNardo and Pischke (1997), Entorf
and Kramarz (1997) and Borghans and ter Weel (2004) argue that the effect
comes from the individual qualities of the workers who use the computers.
These are simply different types of people from those who do not use com-
puters at work. The cause of any pay effects of computer usage might really
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be these individual and occupational differences. We need a way around the
problem, and the most attractive is to use longitudinal data where indi-
viduals are repeatedly measured over time to control for individual
characteristics prior to, for example, being given a PC at work, and for
things that are not measured at all (unmeasured heterogeneity). Some of the
datasets that underpin the chapters of this book provide just this kind of
data, albeit not over long periods – for instance, Home-OnLine (Britain) has
three waves, e-Living (six European countries) only two. But with such data,
it might be possible to see if there are social changes associated with techno-
logical change such as the increased use of e-commerce or of switching to
broadband from narrowband Internet access.
If we return to the sociological approach discussed above, we may find a
non-statistical solution to this problem, because it often simply disregards
it! As we cannot easily distinguish the social from the technological, we
cannot ever unravel a ‘pure’ effect of technology. Nevertheless, even if we
partially accept that cause and effect are conflated, we cannot leave it like
that. We need a method to ensure that, as far as the relationships in which
we are interested can be unravelled, this is done correctly. This applies to
any form of analysis, but here we give an example of a common problem
with regression techniques, which are prominent in this book. We gain by
using these because we nearly always do this in a multivariate form that
enables us to produce a precise figure for the statistical effect of one factor on
another (or an association between them if we are uncertain of a casual rela-
tionship), while controlling for the effects of many other factors. The trouble
is that we usually only have part of the picture. We might have information
on pay and computer usage at work, and also on gender, education and occu-
pation, which comprise the things we mainly wish to control for. But we
often know nothing about, say, motivation. What if computer users earn
more not because they use computers or because they are, say, male, better
educated and in professional jobs, but because, apart from all that, they are
simply more highly motivated? In this case we cannot be sure of our causal
relationships.
Very broadly, there seem to be four main approaches to this problem. The
first is just to pack the equation with as many control variables as possible (if
the data exist), in the hope that the remaining variation associated with the
factor or factors of central interest is at least partially controlled. Some chap-
ters in this book take this approach.
Second, assumptions can be made about the conditions under which these
problems should occur. For instance, the analysis of the effects of computers
on wages is problematic, but we need not assume that this is an issue for
gender differences, so we can perhaps legitimately describe the gendering of
the apparent computer effect even if we do not fully understand the nature
of the causal relationship.
A third approach is to use statistical techniques that deal with variation
in the dependent variable which is not given directly by the variables of
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interest, for instance latent class analysis, fixed effects, or some two-stage
regression process. Each has its own purpose and requirements, but the
latter might be formidable. Fixed effects analysis, for instance, requires
panel data, whilst two-stage analysis requires a variable which is an effective
instrument and this is often not available. Also, not all analysts are familiar
with the techniques on offer and, indeed, no chapters in this volume use any
of these more complex techniques.
Finally, we can make clear in the discussion of the results that we are
uncertain of the causal relationship. Many of the chapters in this book take
this approach. For example using the e-Living data, Sofer and Raban (this
volume, Chapter 6) have information on usage (for instance of the Internet),
personal characteristics such as age and education, and data on competing
leisure or technology usage, such as the amount of time spent watching tele-
vision. Ideally a statistical solution would be found that either controls for
the multiple inter-relationships between these (for instance, TV viewers
have specific characteristics that affect the likelihood of using the Internet),
or explicitly maps the causal relationships. Instead, the authors make certain
assumptions that are important in helping us to understand the nature of
the problem. One, for instance, is that usage of a particular technology is not
determined by, nor determines, other specific usages. Rather, it follows its
own path, which we can try to delineate. It might often be better to make
such assumptions (if they are reasonable!) rather than to rely on complex sta-
tistical techniques.
The social and economic importance of the new ICTs
Much of what we have written above implies that we need analysis, and
overviews of research, that combines more than one approach. The emphasis
in published work is often primarily from one angle, whether broadly soci-
ological, social psychological or economic. We believe that these aspects are
all different sides of the same coinage, even if each offers a very particular
type of insight. In this book we have chapters that look at the social and
sociological side, but from the economic angle we include work on the rela-
tionship between computers and wages (as an indicator of productivity),
while on the commercial side we have inputs on the take-up of broadband
and on the growth of ICTs in business-to-business operations.
What sorts of effects can these multiple approaches give an insight into?
The literature commonly refers to effects that describe how people relate to
each other, how they achieve functional goals, whether the patterns of their
lives change – especially through the substitution of one activity through
another – and how they work. The first of these has been extensively covered
elsewhere, especially in books where the predominant ethos is either
social–psychological (e.g. Kraut et al., forthcoming) or sociological (e.g.
Wellman and Haythornthwaite, 2002). None of our chapters are specifically
on the issue of networking. However, three chapters investigate the possibil-
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ity that the new ICTs enhance social capital (Ling, Anderson, and Heres and
Thomas). The main conclusion that can perhaps be drawn from these is that
the case for an ICT effect is not strong. The studies by Ling, and by Heres
and Thomas, indicate that there may be some interactions between ICTs and
bonding as well as bridging capital. In the case of bonding capital, which
stems from strong ties with similar others, Ling’s work shows the way in
which mobile phones and email are used to maintain informal social net-
works. In the case of bridging capital, which stems from weak ties with dis-
similar others, Heres and Thomas show that even when a range of
socio-demographic factors are controlled for, those who engage in civic
activities are much more likely to be Internet users than those who do not
participate. Whilst neither chapter makes strong claims about causal rela-
tionships, we could suggest that either increased ICT usage increases social
activity levels (perhaps by facilitating arrangements), or that the socially
active need ICTs to help manage their lives – or, indeed, that both are
occurring simultaneously. Anderson examines potential ICT effects on life
satisfaction, finding generally little causal link between the two.
The question of the achievement of functional goals is mostly considered
here on the basis of what particular types of people might wish and expect.
Dutton and colleagues use an international comparative dataset to show how
use and non-use may be re-configuring access to people, information and ser-
vices where participation in this process may be becoming an issue of choice
as well as of exclusion through social stratification. This is echoed by
DiDuca, Partridge and Heres who look at the question of the functionality
of ICTs for older people. They show that lower use of Internet among the
elderly is a result of lack of knowledge about the technology rather than
mere technophobia – older people who are users are no different from other
users. They suggest several means of encouraging Internet use among older
people, such as through public service delivery, and through health services.
Livingstone and Bober analyse the Internet use by young people. Children
gain valued social status by their Internet experience and particularly enjoy
new opportunities for communications opened by the Internet. In other
words, children add a value of their own to the use of the new ICTs. Sofer
and Raban discuss in their chapter the gender gaps in ICT access and usage,
and note that, at least in the e-Living sample, gender gaps in ICT usage are
still to be found. However, one of the strongest determinants of this is
workforce participation (which links well with the message of some other
chapters). Implicitly, an increase in the participation rates of women will
contribute to reducing the gendered gap. The authors point to a gap in the
intensity of home Internet usage, associated mainly with more negative atti-
tudes towards computers and the Internet, but overall it is difficult to
believe that the gender differences in ICT access and use are anything more
than superficial. The technologies may be functional in different ways for
men and women (Boneva and Kraut, 2002) but in overall terms probably
equally functional. Such social distinctions also appear in the chapter by
Introduction 11
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Bakardjieva, who addresses how people become a part of the social network
of Internet users in Bulgaria, where usage is in its infancy and where the
costs of access are high relative to income. Here we see, though, that the
standard emphasis on social exclusion breaks down. Now, not only is there
no clear exclusion between Bulgarians and people in richer countries, as pro-
fessionals in Eastern Europe see it as important to be part of the inter-
national community, but within Bulgaria illicit provision of and access to
services extends the network amongst those who would otherwise be
excluded.
Substitution effects are a central part of the modern research effort
because these say something directly about the social role of ICTs. If the
Internet replaces social life (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie, 2001), then the social
effect is clearly negative. But, as Heres and Thomas note in their chapter,
perhaps the Internet complements traditional social behaviour. The chapter
by Gershuny specifically tackles this issue through the use of panel data to
show that people with specific characteristics select into technology uses,
rather than being affected by them, and can therefore on the basis of probab-
ility be recognised as users in advance by these characteristics. The social
underpins the technology, not vice versa. Raban in his chapter of trends in
usage similarly finds rather weak relationships in the e-Living sample
between the daily time spent at home on the Internet and the frequency of
several leisure activities (sports, cinema, restaurants, reading and friends’
visits). For most leisure activities, increased Internet usage time hardly
affects leisure frequency. Similar issues of substitution and the effects of
switching to broadband Internet access are discussed in Anderson and
Raban, showing that whilst ‘broadband for all’ may lead to more time being
spent online, it may not make much difference to other aspects of everyday
life.
To these effects we can add changes that relate not to social life or con-
sumption, but to work. This is important because a very large part of
people’s active time is spent at work, and so the aspirations and expectations
we derive from it, especially through the adequate utilisation of skills, is
often fundamental to people’s well-being. Whilst some of the most far-
reaching effects of the new technologies occur through organisational
change, income from work helps to determine consumption levels, and this
in turn has major implications for the demand for new technologies and
associated services. In addition, income enables people to spend more on
traditional services such as house -cleaning, gardening or home improve-
ments (Gershuny, 2000), which releases time for hobbies, or further work
which could increase ICT usage and demand.
One element in this network of relationships is the effects of IT usage or
skills on wages; if these are positive, an aggregate effect on national produc-
tivity (and wealth) is implied through their summation. Alternatively,
employers might also introduce computers not only to replace workers but
to replace their skills. Much work with computers might therefore be
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monotonous, uncreative and poorly paid, leading to a decrease in wealth.
Thus analysis has to look out for potential distributional outcomes as well as
average effects. Brynin’s chapter locates the argument not in terms of pro-
ductivity but of the gendering of technology, an issue of long-standing
interest (Cockburn, 1983), finding that women have gained in general from
computers, but also that some women have gained substantially more than
others.
The use of a computer is a crude indicator of a technological work
process. There are computers for complex and for simple tasks. Using the
Dutch dataset, Telepanel, Steijn and Tijdens look at the distribution of
usage in terms of three indicators – complexity (especially technical), diver-
sity (of functions or software) and intensity (indicating hours of usage). They
find that women are likely to use computers more intensively than men, but
also in less complex and diverse ways. Thus, there remains a gender bias in
the use of computers at work. The work of Steijn and Tijdens is not explic-
itly about gender, however. More generally, they argue that we can see a
clear distribution in the potential welfare outcomes in terms of quality of
the work experience.
Overall work-based effects are perhaps amongst the strongest found in
this book, although here too selection issues are at stake. Haddon and
Brynin’s chapter looks at this with respect to telework, which is often held
to be a potential factor in changing the relationship between work and
home. It is well known that telework remains a very marginal form of work,
but this chapter also argues that its use reflects traditional work patterns and
social divisions, rather than adding to them. Nevertheless, improving the
quality of life in society, for instance through the encouragement of tele-
work, is one of the key objectives of some governments. However, Anderson
and Yttri show that this is difficult to achieve. Not only is there consider-
able churn to and from traditional forms of work, but switching workstyles
seems to have no positive effect on either job satisfaction or overall quality of
life. Indeed, in some cases the effect is negative.
Economic effects are, of course, much broader than this, and this is cap-
tured by the studies in this book that work at the macro level. Implicit in
some of the chapters just discussed is the distribution and utilisation of
skills. This has important welfare implications which increasingly span the
entire globe. When rich countries lack these skills, at least in sufficient
numbers, they often seek to import them. People in poorer countries have at
the same time a constant incentive to migrate. The ‘brain drain’ is an
inevitable result. The clearest and most controversial source of this is in the
field of medical care, with increasing reliance on (rather weak) bi-lateral
agreements between governments to limit this. Yet governments, non-
governmental institutions and private companies in poorer countries invest
in other skills which are also prone to loss abroad. ICT professionals figure in
this, almost to the same extent as health professionals. Here the moral
dimension is perhaps less straightforward – after all, the individuals who
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choose to migrate have also invested in their skills. Nevertheless, the welfare
loss to the originating country could be considerable. Rothgang and
Schmidt tackle this difficult subject here in an innovative piece of work that
examines the determinants of high-skilled migration into OECD countries
and, through analysis of the impact of international demand for skills on the
expansion of education in poorer countries, some of the welfare effects. Is
there a straight transfer of welfare from poor to rich country, or is it more
complex than that?
Even after the subsiding of the Internet bubble, the new ICT develop-
ments are clearly big business. One way of looking at this is to examine the
share of GDP growth taken up by the new ICTs (OECD, 2003) or, alterna-
tively, the aggregate effects on productivity associated with it (e.g. Black
and Lynch, 2001). A further approach to the assessment of the impact of the
new ICTs is to measure the share of e-commerce in the world’s GDP. Dehio
and Graskamp undertake this in their chapter. Looking at 2001, right after
the dissipation of the bubble, this share amounted to only 1 or 2 per cent,
but they argue that this is expected to rise to 8 per cent in 2010.
Of course computerisation in the workplace need not be simply about
getting the job done, although this is paramount, but may also be about
reducing environmental costs especially where incentivised by shareholder
pressure or tax and legislation regimes. Alakeson and Goodman provide a
range of insights into sustainable business practices through the lens of
corporate social responsibility. Like Pasquini and Viccario, they highlight
the potential benefits of increased dematerialisation whether it be of business
transactions (Alakeson) or music consumption (Pasquini), but also note that
such benefits are often erased by subsequent rebound effects where people,
for perfectly rational reasons, choose to re-materialise digital material.
This wide-ranging discussion of the economic effects of change in ICT
development, from aggregate economic indicators, through the effects on
the wages and work processes of different social groups, to international
flows of skills, denotes distinctive changes in the distribution of social out-
comes of various kinds. As our discussion of the direct social effect implies,
it is possibly through such economic changes that we will first be able to
observe and measure the social effects of the new technologies. This is not to
say that social effects that are non-economic in origin are likely to be unim-
portant, but that they are inherently harder to measure. In setting
economically oriented studies alongside the studies of social processes in this
book, we hope that readers can build on this more integrated view of ICTs
and social change.
Conclusion
If there is one word that perhaps simply encapsulates the changes we have
described, it is speed. The things we do – obtain or provide information,
communicate with people, buy things, use services – are done or obtained
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faster than ever before. Perhaps, in the case of the new ICTs, speed generates
a qualitative change in so far as more can be done, more intensively, and
perhaps both more freely and knowingly than before (though Marx com-
mented to the effect that the development of the modern press ushered in an
age not of instant knowledge but of instant rumour). Writers on post-
modernism such as Harvey (1997) have argued that it is the ability to cut
and paste life that now makes things so different. According to this view,
the new technologies allow the shifting of functions and uses to fit in with
personal inclinations. Technologies have lost their bullying, uncompromis-
ing nature. Perhaps here we can begin to see how technology is merging
with a new social way of doing things. Nevertheless, many of the processes
we and others have described touch most people’s lives either not at all or at
best tangentially.
Our claim is not that there are no social effects of the new technologies.
Rather, they are widespread but weak. It is also quite clear that, for a long
time now, the new ICTs have combined and delivered final services in ways
that alter social patterns (Gershuny, 1983). This applies to many household
appliances. In respect of information and communications, it applies to tele-
phony, television and even newspapers and books. Yet all these things
existed before the new ICTs, which therefore simply intensify and mediate
much the same sort of content that have always come through the mass
media. Are these new ways of doing things leading to quantitative and
qualitative shifts? With the best evidence available, much of which is cap-
tured in this book, it still seems too early to tell.
As a result, the chapters in this volume are rightly cautious about making
causal inferences and major claims. Rather, most authors see a complex
interaction or co-evolution of social and technological change that is produc-
ing widespread but weak changes when viewed close up and over short
timescales. This book is one assessment of these changes, with a focus,
although not completely so, on Europe. Our emphasis on both the social and
the economic illustrates the complexity of phenomena that we and the con-
tributors to this volume study. As this introduction has implied, and each
chapter will show, this complexity also requires sophisticated data and
methods to be able to say anything meaningful, and these are neither cheap
to acquire nor easy to apply. We hope that this volume contributes both to
the development of these methods and also to the development of more
nuanced understandings of the relationships between ICTs and socioeco-
nomic change.
However the book’s strongest message must be that we should carefully
re-think the simple macro-economic model which supposes that increased
quality of life, social cohesion and so forth will automatically follow from
ICT innovations and supply-side interventions. Again, we need a more
nuanced view. The small effects are certainly occurring. It remains to be seen
whether these will merge into some big effect.
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